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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 45030
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-16-28121
v. )
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The district court sentenced Jermaine James Arrats to thirty years, with ten years fixed,
for  robbery.  Mr.  Arrats  then  filed  an  Idaho  Criminal  Rule  35  (“Rule  35”)  motion.  The  district
court denied the motion, and Mr. Arrats appeals to this Court.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Arrats with robbery, a felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-6501 and -
6502. (R., pp.45–46.) According to the police report in the sentencing materials, Mr. Arrats
forcefully removed a man from his car and drove the car away. (Presentence Investigation
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Report (“PSI”),1 pp.51–53, 55–56.) Mr. Arrats crashed the car about ten minutes later. (PSI,
pp.54, 63.) At the time of the offense, Mr. Arrats was under the influence of methamphetamine.
(PSI, pp.54, 57, 63, 86.) He explained that he was experiencing drug-induced psychosis. (PSI,
pp.4–5.) Just prior to the offense, Mr. Arrats had fled his motel room in only his underwear and
socks, fearing for his life and believing people were trying to kidnap and murder him. (PSI,
pp.4–5, 63.) Indeed, he reported that he called the police twice for help the night of the crime due
to his hallucinations. (PSI, pp.4–5.) As he was running away from the people he believed were
trying to kill him, Mr. Arrats explained that he took the victim’s car as a “fight or flight instinct.”
(PSI, p.5.)
Pursuant to an Idaho Criminal Rule 11 plea agreement, Mr. Arrats entered an Alford2 plea
to robbery. (R., pp.81–83, 72–73; see generally Tr. Vol. I,3 p.5, L.1–p.27, L.4) Mr. Arrats and
the State also agreed to request a sentence of thirty years, with ten years fixed, (R., p.82;
Tr. Vol. I, p.5, Ls.19–22.) At sentencing, the State and Mr. Arrats’s trial counsel recommended
the district court impose the agreed-upon sentence. (Tr. Vol. I, p.46, Ls.4–8, p.52, L.21–p.53,
L.4.) The district court followed the plea agreement, sentencing Mr. Arrats to thirty years, with
ten years fixed. (R., pp.94–95, 97–99; Tr. Vol. I, p.66, Ls.7–15.)
Mr. Arrats timely appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.101–
02.) Less than one month later, Mr. Arrats filed a pro se Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.120–26.) He
argued his sentence was illegal and the district court should reduce his sentence. (R., p.121.) The
1 Citations to the PSI refer to the 112-page electronic document containing the confidential
exhibits.
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
3 There  are  two  transcripts  on  appeal.  The  first,  cited  as  Volume  I,  contains  the  entry  of  plea
hearing and two of three sentencing hearings. The second, cited as Volume II, contains a third
sentencing hearing.
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district court denied his motion. (R., pp.131–33.) Mr. Arrats filed a timely pro se notice of
appeal. (R., pp.135–38.)
ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Arrats’s Rule 35 motion?
ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Arrats’s Rule 35 Motion
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 states in relevant part:
(a) Illegal Sentences. The court may correct a sentence that is illegal from the
face of the record at any time.
(b) Sentences Imposed in an Illegal Manner or Reduction of Sentence. Within 120
days  of  the  entry  of  the  judgment  imposing  sentence  .  .  .  ,  a  motion  may be
filed to correct or reduce a sentence and the court may correct or reduce the
sentence. . . . Motions are considered and determined by the court without
additional testimony and without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered. A
defendant may only file one motion seeking a reduction of sentence.
I.C.R. 35(a), (b). “Rule 35 is a narrow rule which allows a trial court to correct an illegal
sentence or to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner.” State v. Colvin, 394 P.3d 110,
111 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 735 (2007)). “[T]he rule only
applies to a narrow category of cases in which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not
authorized by law or where new evidence tends to show that the original sentence was
excessive.” State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 86 (2009).
Under Rule 35(a),
the term ‘illegal sentence’ . . . is narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal
from the face of the record; i.e., does not involve significant questions of fact or
require an evidentiary hearing. The rule is limited to legal questions surrounding
the defendant’s sentence, and any factual issues must be apparent from the face of
the record.
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State v. Meier, 159 Idaho 712, 713 (Ct. App. 2016) (citations omitted). On the other hand, a Rule
35(b) motion “is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.”
State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). In reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule
35(b) motion, the Court must “consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used for
determining the reasonableness of the original sentence.” Id. The  Court  “conduct[s]  an
independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App.
2000). “Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under Rule 35,”
the Court’s scope of review “includes all information submitted at the original sentencing
hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce.” State v. Araiza, 109 Idaho
188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the
district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
Mindful of the Rule 35 motion requirements, Mr. Arrats nonetheless maintains the
district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion. As argued by Mr. Arrats:
(1) I presented evidence; i.e., the police report of Sgt. Madden, that I
called the 911 operator for assistance from the police, because I believed my life
was in danger. The Garden City Police did not make personal contact with me. By
not  making  contact  with  me  or  coming  to  my  aide,  I  was  forced  to  act  in  self-
defense to flee from my attackers. I perceived the threat against my life and safety
to be real.
When I presented evidence that the actions alleged were in self-defense
(which I did), the burden then should have shifted to the State of Idaho to show
“beyond a reasonable doubt” that the acts charged did not occur as an act of self-
defense.
2) The Idaho Code, 19-202(A) states as follows: “No person in this State
shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind what-so-ever for protecting himself .
. . by reasonable means necessary . . .
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All the witnesses, all of the victims, all of the police reports state the same
fact. The defendant, wearing only his socks and underwear, approached the
victim, asked for a ride, was refused this ride, and in response he took the vehicle
of the victim.
The victim makes a more clear statement. He states that the defendant ran
up to his vehicle, hit the window, demanded that the victim assist him in “getting
out of here by giving him a ride.” The victim refused to do so.
Once more, the police report of Sgt. Madden, dated September 1st, 2016,
provides the following information:
(a) That the defendant called 911 at 5:38 a.m. and requested assistance
because he feared for his safety.
(b) That the defendant called 911 at 7:30 a.m. and again requested assistance
because he feared for his safety.
(c) That at no time after the above calls were made did the Garden City Police
ever make contact with the defendant.
(d) That at 12:30 the defendant, fearing for his life and his safety, jumped
from the window of his motel room, ran down the street in his socks and
under-wear, asked for assistance from the victim, (who refused to assist
the defendant by refusing to give him a ride away from his attackers), and,
in a self-defense action, the defendant took the vehicle so he could get to
safety.
3) All of this information is in the record of this case, in the pre-sentence
report; in the police report of Sgt. Madden; in the victim’s statement, and
inasmuch, is clear from the record.
4) Under 19-202(A), the State Supreme Court has held, “. . . Evidence of
some level of a reasonable fear of bodily harm is all that is required to assert self-
defense.” State v. Hanson, 133 Idaho 323, 986 P.2d 346 (1999).
5) The defendant did show that he had a reasonable fear of bodily harm,
he called the police for assistance, not once but twice, and no one showed up!!
The acts charged are acts that were done in self-defense, and as such, the
sentence imposed upon the defendant is illegally imposed in violation of 19-
202(A).
Conclusion
Self-defense is an affirmative defense. One which must admittedly have
had to occur before it can be ruled to be a justifiable action.
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Once  a  defendant  shows  that  his  acts  were  done  in  self-defense  (by  a
preponderance of the evidence), then the burden shifts to the State of Idaho to
prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the acts were not justified.
The defendant met his burden of proof, and it was error for this court to
impose a sentence upon the defendant when the State of Idaho did not meet their
burden of proof that the acts charged were not done in self-defense.
(R., pp.121–25 (omissions and underline in original).) In light of this argument, Mr. Arrats
requested that the district court “dismiss the criminal charges of robbery as self-defense,” but
“uphold the civil order of restitution.” (R., p.126.) Mindful of the limitations of Rule 35(a) and
(b) motions, Mr. Arrats maintains the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Arrats respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court vacate the district court’s order
denying his Rule 35 motion and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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